Аннотация
This book offers the first comprehensive analysis, over two formative decades, of Britain's complex relationship with UN peacekeeping - the use of international unarmed or lightly armed soldiers to help preserve a ceasefire. It charts the evolution of British views on an international organization running its own military forces and policy-makers' determination that peacekeeping's character, uses, and management should remain compatible with UK national interests. It analyses their efforts to influence, contain and exploit individual operations: in Palestine, Kashmir, Egypt (following the Suez Crisis), Lebanon, The Congo and Cyprus. Benefits to Britain included shedding colonial responsibilities, containing conflicts, face-saving, and burden-sharing; perceived risks included interference in remaining colonies and threats to post-colonial interests. Also covered are several instances when British Governments preferred unilateral deployment: Jordan (1958), Kuwait (1961) and East Africa (1964). The account also addresses some issues of contemporary relevance, including the tension between neutrality and impartiality, the (in)dispensability of the parties' consent to a UN operation, and the use of force.
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