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But what has Mr. Wiesenthal's inability to come up with a consistent or credible biography got

to do with the quality of his professional denunciations? - The evidence suggests that the two

are equally shoddy. Had 60 Minutes looked into Mr. Wiesenthal's professional background, it

would quickly have found much to wonder at. It would, for one thing, have quickly come across

the case of Frank Walus, The Nazi Who Never Was.

Frank Walus: The Nazi Who Never Was

In 1976 Simon Wiesenthal, in Vie

emigre living in Chicago, Frank Walus, had been a collaborator involved in

persecuting Polish Jews, including women and children, as part of a Gestapo-led

auxiliary police unit. Walus, charged Wiesenthal, "performed his duties with

the Gestapo in the ghettos of Czestochowa and Kielce and handed over numerous

Jews to the Gestapo." (Charles Ashman Robert J. Wagman, The Nazi Hunters,

1988, p. 193)

Walus, in turn, was convicted by judge Julius Hoffman, who

ran the trial with an iron hand and an eccentricity that bordered on the

bizarre. He allowed government witnesses great latitude, while limiting

severely Korenkiewicz's cross-examination of them. When Walus himself

testified, Hoffman limited him almost entirely to simple yes and no answers.

(Charles Ashman Robert J. Wagman, The Nazi Hunters, 1988, p. 193)

Despite weaknesses in the prosecution case, Judge Hoffman went on to convict Walus, and later

despite accumulating evidence of Walus's i

then a formal appeal was filed. The process took almost two years, but in

February 1980, the court ruled. It threw out Hoffman's verdict and ordered

Walus retried. In making the ruling, the court said that it appeared the

government's case against Walus was "weak" but that Hoffman's handling of the

trial had been so biased that it could not evaluate the evidence properly.

(Charles Ashman Robert J. Wagman, The Nazi Hunters, 1988, p. 195)

In view of irrefutable documentary and eye-witness evidence that Walus had served as a farm

laborer in Germany during the entire war, he was never re-tried. And what, we may ask, was the

occasion for Simon Wiesenthal's fingering Walus in the first place?

Only later was the source of the "evidence" against Walus that had reached

Simon Wiesenthal identified. Walus had bought a two-family duplex when he came

to Chicago. In the early 1970s, he rented out the second unit to a tenant with

whom he eventually had a fight. Walus evicted the tenant, who then started

telling one and all how his former landlord used to sit around and reminisce

about the atrocities he had committed against Jews in the good old days.

Apparently one of the groups to which he told the story was a Jewish refugee

agency in Chicago, which passed the information along to Simon Wiesenthal.

(Charles Ashman Robert J. Wagman, The Nazi Hunters, 1988, p. 195)

For a statement concerning the Walus case made by Frank Walus himself, please read Frank Walus's

letter to Germany.

The Deschenes Commission

But is the Walus case a single slipup in Simon Wiesenthal's otherwise blemish-free career? No,

other slipups can be found - in one instance a batch of 6,000 others. Simon Wiesenthal kicked

the ball into play with the accusation that Canada harbored "several hundred" war criminals

(Toronto Star, May 19, 1971). The Jewish Defense League caught the ball, found it soft and

inflated it to "maybe 1,000" (Globe and Mail, July 5, 1983) before tossing it to Edward

Greenspan. Edward Greenspan mustered enough hot air to inflate it to 2,000 (Globe and Mail,

November 21, 1983) before tossing it to Sol Littman whose lung capacity was able to raise it to





3,000 (Toronto Star, November 8, 1984). The ball, distended beyond recognition, was tossed back

to Wiesenthal who boldly puffed it up to 6,000 (New York Daily News, May 16, 1986) and then made

the mistake of trying to kick it - but poof! The ball burst!

Judge Jules Deschenes writing the report for Canada's Commission on War Criminals first

certifies that the ball had indeed reached the record-breaking 6,000 Canadian war criminals:

The Commission has ascertained from the New York Daily News that this figure is

correct and is not the result of a printing error. (Jules Deschenes,

Commission of Inquiry on War Criminals, 1986, p. 247)

But now the big ball was gone, and all that was left was the deflated pigskin which Mr.

Wiesenthal lamely flopped on the Commission's table - a list of 217 names (which in other places

becomes a list of 218 or 219 names). The list was focussed on Ukrainians - Mr. Wiesenthal's

Vie

of Hitler's S.S. (elite guard), which ran death camps in Eastern Europe, are living in Canada."

Upon subjecting the deflated ball to close and prolonged scrutiny, Judge Deschenes, arrived at

the following conclusions:

Between 1971 and 1986, public statements by outside interveners concerning

alleged war criminals residing in Canada have spread increasingly large and

grossly exaggerated figures as to their estimated number ... [among them] the

figure of 6,000 ventured in 1986 by Mr. Simon Wiesenthal.... (p. 249)

The high level reached by some of those figures, together with the wide

discrepancy between them, contributed to create both revulsion and

interrogation. (p. 245)

It was obvious that the list of 217 officers of the Galicia Division furnished

by Mr. Wiesenthal was nearly totally useless and put the Canadian government,

through the RCMP [Royal Canadian Mounted Police] and this Commission, to a

considerable amount of purposeless work. (p. 258)

The Commission has tried repeatedly to obtain the incriminating evidence

allegedly in Mr. Wiesenthal's possession, through various oral and written

communications with Mr. Wiesenthal himself and with his solicitor, Mr. Martin

Mendelsohn of Washington, D.C., but to no avail: telephone calls, letters, even

a meeting in New York between Mr. Wiesenthal and Commission Counsel on 1

November 1985 followed up by further direct communications, have succeeded in

bringing no positive results, outside of promises. (p. 257)

From the conclusions of the Deschenes Commission alone, 60 Minutes might have decided that Simon

Wiesenthal is not the kind of person whose pronouncements may be aired without verification.

Had any Ukrainian come to 60 Minutes carrying such a load of hatred toward Jews as Simon

Wiesenthal carries toward Ukrainians, and displaying - or rather flaunting - such credentials of

unreliability, 60 Minutes would never have given him air time, or if it did, it would be only to

excoriate him. Instead of exposing Mr. Wiesenthal, 60 Minutes has joined him in portraying a

world filled with Nazis, and so has lent support to a witch hunt more hysterical than Joe

McCarthy's sniffing out of Communists in the 50's. Consider the following excerpts from cases

submitted to the Deschenes commission for investigation as suspected Nazi war criminals, and see

if you don't agree. In the Commission report, all of the following cases end with the words,

"On the basis of the foregoing, it is recommended that the file on the subject be closed." The

selection is not intended to be representative, as the overwhelming number of cases are simply

dismissed for lack of evidence - but rather is a sample of cases that upon casual browsing stand