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...Our purpose in the name of peace is not the overthrow of the Soviet government. Of course, we are aspiring to create such circumstances and situation, which the present Soviet leaders will not tolerate and which will not be to their liking. Perhaps, when facing such a situation, they will not be able to preserve their power in Russia. But it should be stressed with full authority-it is their concern, not our...
...It is a matter of priority to make and keep the Soviet Union weak – politically, militarily and psychologically – vis-à-vis the external forces which are out of its control.
...We should not hope to fully impose our will on the Russian territory, as we have tried to do in Germany and Japan. We must understand that the final resolution should be political.
...If the worst occurs, namely, the Soviet power will be preserved on the whole or almost whole present Soviet territory, we must require:
a) fulfilment of pure military conditions (surrender of weapons, evacuation of key regions etc.) in order to ensure long-term military disability;
b) fulfilment of conditions aiming to ensure significant economic dependence on the external world.
…In other words, we must create automatic guarantees to ensure that even non-communist regime, nominally friendly to us:
a) does not possess of significant military might;
b) remains largely dependant on the external world in economic respect;
c) does not exercise serious control over main national minorities;
d) does not establish anything that would resemble the iron curtain.
In case such a regime will prove to be hostile to communists and friendly to us, we must take care that these terms be imposed in neither insulting nor humiliating way. But we must impose them by any means to protect our interests».
And this is not just an episode, a kind of "extraction" from general statistics of facts characterizing American foreign policy. The NSC-68 Directive of 30.09.1950 (ibid, pp. 64, 65) envisions:
«... to sow the seeds of destruction inside the Soviet system in order to make Kremlin at least to change its policy … But without superior military might, available and easily mobilized, the policy of “deterrence” which essentially is the policy of calculated and gradual compulsion, is no more than a bluff».
The own policy is tacitly presumed to be irreproachable.
«...We must conduct an open psychological war to provoke mass treachery with respect to Soviets and to ruin other Kremlin plans. To strengthen positive and relevant steps and actions by secret means in the field of economic and psychological war in order to provoke and support riots and rebellions in selected and strategically important satellite-states.
...Besides the affirmation of our values, our policy and our actions must be such as to cause fundamental changes in the very nature of the Soviet system, and the failure of Kremlin's plans is the first important step to achieve these changes. It is absolutely evident that if these changes are resulting from the activities of internal forces of the Soviet society this will cost less while being more efficient…
Victory, for sure, will be secured by the failure of Kremlin's plans as a result of gradual increase of free world ability and its implantation in the Soviet world in such a way as to cause internal changes of the Soviet system».[5]
As reported by N.N. Yakovlev (so much unloved by many democratizers-Sakharov followers) the total edition of the book «The CIA against the USSR» and of extracts from it accounted by 1991 to 20 million. For this very reason, the analysts of Soviet and Russian secret services could be unaware of its contents and unable to react adequately only if there was a persistent will not to be aware. This persistence may be explained either by direct treachery[6] or by conviction, – as Y.G. Kobaladze puts it in one of his interviews,-that he did not believe in any conspiracies or «judo-mason» centres, agents of influence etc.
Well, so he does not believe, come what may, and even life realities are nothing for him; therefore he is claiming that «the Soviet Union had been pulled down not by the CIA. We did it ourselves.» As for how «we did it ourselves» in full conformity with the overseas directives aimed to destroy the USSR in the time of peace – the analysis of this problem is far from being priority matter for our native state analysts, though all good-will policy-makers and businessmen should know why the cited overseas directives regarding Russia have not turned to become useless as the proverb provides: «Dog is baying, wind is taking».
But in historical context, the above cited US NSC Directives as well as many other papers still unpublished were preceded also by the notorious «Protocols of the Zion Sages» – truly false document by virtue of its origin, insofar as its primary purpose was- by revealing the fact of its forgery – to create prejudice with regard to real programme, formulated there in general, the programme of management of the XX century global civilization. As one may remember, the overthrow of great empires of Eurasia, including the Russian Empire-and this had been done in the course of the First World War of the XX century, was treated as a special subject in the materials of this diversionary operation which was arranged irreproachably, by the way, in psychological terms (given the prevailing social attitudes of those times).
Those who considered the programmes, as formulated in the «Protocols», to be authentic, were said to be «crazy» by others who were not believing in any global conspiracies and agents of influence and thus were inactive, doing nothing to prevent that the doctrine, as formulated in the «Protocols», comes true. Hence, the «Protocols» worked. The result is well known.
Z. Brzezinski’s book is not something outstanding even from the position of how goals and means with respect to Russia and some other countries are exposed in it: it is just one of many overseas voluptuary desires and directives where these desires are spelt.
On the other hand, when – as at the times of J.V. Stalin (Koba)[7] – the leadership of the Russian statehood-civilization is convinced that other states and non-governmental international circles are trying to achieve their goals on the territory of Russia and inside its society- thus entailing conspiracies supported by local agents of influence- the course of events proves to be quite different. In the same US NSC Directive-20/1 of August 18, 1948 we find the following words to specify the period between 1933 and 1948, when this very approach was prevailing in the USSR with respect to internal and foreign policies: «We have withstood too much during the last 15 years...» But if the analysis in the spirit of Koba and the politics based on it are replaced by Kobaladze’s approach, then it is our turn to withstand. Therefore the time has come to put an end to such analysis and such ensuing policies in order not to have to withstand furthermore the stupidity and the villainy.
Meanwhile, as long as global-range political and sociological analysis underlying state-policy in Russia is based on tradition : «I believe or not, and thus I don’t want to know» – and this is the case of Y.G. Kobaladze and of many others- nothing inside Russia itself can generally prevent that all kinds of directives – originating from the overseas and manifesting the goals of their rulers with regard to Russia, all of us and of our descendants included, – come true, no matter whether these directives are spoken out or not.
In case this situation in Russia persists, the country may be protected against such overseas directives only if the directive-makers commit mistakes that would make these directives unviable or bring results opposite to expected.
A question may arise: «How does the legend’s plot, by which we begin the present analytical note, correlate with all this and, in particular, with Z. Brzezinski’s book»? The fact is that if not all of Russia then its overwhelming majority is used to view Z. Brzezinski as one of the most powerful political analysts of the world whose role in the ending of the Cold War by American victory and by collapse of the USSR as a state was far from being minor.[8] At the same time, however, the majority is not familiar with what constitutes the substance of views advocated by Z. Brzezinski but just admires his authority boosted by mass-media. Meanwhile, the publication of his book in our country has changed the situation in core: the opportunity has emerged for the Russian reader to observe, – naked as they are, – the morals of Z. Brzezinski, – essentially, a typical representative of the American political «elite» – and his corresponding world outlook and intellectual culture. Thus, the way has been opened to see and touch «the intellectual muscles» of one of the «strategists-wi