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With such weaknesses there could be no line in depth, indeed there was no line as such and it was not protected by a sufficient artillery force. Although the country into which the Panzer Army was withdrawing favoured the defence, the steep djebels reduced the effectiveness of Allied armour, there was no avoiding the issue that a concentrated infantry offensive would crumple the German front at Mareth like paper. Such reserves as could be scraped together once put into the line to restore a difficult situation would leave nothing to halt a further Allied penetration. The obvious solutions were either to withdraw to more favourable positions — in Rommel's opinion the Gabes area - or to carry out a series of spoiling attacks to delay the Allied build-up for the final blow.
The difficulties facing the armies in Africa were still not appreciated either at OKW or at Commando Supremo and neither Rommel's requests nor von Arnim's questions on supplies were granted or answered. Von Arnim indeed was to comment bitterly that one ca
For the German commanders the situation was nothing short of calamitous. The 5th Panzer Army had only 34 serviceable tanks and Rommel's Army a total of 89 German and 24 Italian vehicles. The amounts of material reaching Africa fell a long way short of the absolute minimum and of the average figure of 90,000 tons per month no less than 25 per cent would be sunk before it had reached Tunisia. Thus the amount which would actualls arrive in the country would be barely sufficient for an army which was not engaged in active fighting. When Hitler was made aware of the African theatre's critical supply situation he immediately ordered the to
The only firm statement which Rommel received from Kesselring was Hitler's order that the Mareth Line was to be held to the last and that any British moves to outflank the defensive positions were to be met with offensive operations. Once again the Fiihrer was either ignorant of the true facts or chose to ignore the facts that the Army had only 1.5 per cent of its battle requirements and only 0.5 per cent of its stated ammunition needs. In any case there was insufficient fuel to carry out Hitler's demand for aggressive operations.
With von Arnim, Kesselring fared even worse than with Rommel. Rommel had never had any of the promises fulfilled which OKW, or Hitler, or the Commando Supremo had made to him in respect of supplies and arms but this situation was a completely new one to von Arnim who expected promises and schedules to be kept. To Kesselring's criticisms of his conduct of the Army, von Arnim asked what his role was and received the reply that he was to halt any Allied advance by weakening this while 1st Panzer Army held Mareth to the last. Arnim then referred to the constant shortages in supplies, arms, and men but this was ignored and Kesselring asked instead the reasons for moving his panzer divisions. The simple answer, von Arnim replied, was that in the north there was a strong Allied army, in the south there was the strong 8th Army, and in the centre the growing power of an American Army whose strength he estimated as three divisions and against which he could throw only one regiment. He returned to the question of supplies but Kesselring refused to be drawn into stating actual to
But before the British blow fell Rommel had pla
The Panzer Army Africa attack opened at dawn on 6 March, two days later than pla
As the armoured might of the veteran panzer divisions poured out of the passes to attack, the British reaction showed that they were prepared and waiting so that instead of a drive round the flank and rear of 8th Army's artillery belt the panzers were being compelled to make a frontal assault against massed gun fire. Even before the panzer block had shaken out into attack formation the Royal Artillery had opened up and a quarter of the attack force lay smashed and broken. The panzers withdrew to come on again at 13.00hrs but this drive, too, collapsed in a hurricane of British fire, Cramer, the new commander of Africa Corps, saw himself faced with a string of disasters. His armoured thrusts had failed with a loss of 55 tanks and 10 times as many human casualties, the 10th Panzer had reached Medeinine but could carry the advance no further forward and there w.ere reports of a British column of 400 vehicles advancing towards Medeinine from Ben Gardane. Finally the attack by 90th Light had been a blow into empty space for the British had simply moved back before the blow fell.
Cramer had no choice but to break off the attack and as the panzer columns withdrew during the night it was clear to the German commanders that they had shot their last bolt. The last major German offensive in Africa had opened and died on the same day and from this point on, with the exception of local and minor excursions with limited means and with strictly limited objectives, the Army Group Africa would play only a defensive role and that for a limited period. The life of the Axis forces in Africa could now be measured in weeks. The initiative had passed into Allied hands and was never to be recovered.
Rommel flew to Rome where Commando Supremo accepted that the Mareth Line should be evacuated and that new positions, the Schott Line, should be taken up. This new position would reduce the length of front and saving of men would allow these to form a thicker concentration of units at sensitive points. Rommel proposed an even more dramatic solution, nothing less than a reduction of the bridgehead to a compact defensive area ma
These men represented a constant drain on the supplies of the Axis armies. At the begi