The Arabs: A History

Arab defeat in Palestine and the emergence of the state of Israel completely destabilized the newly independent Arab states. The months immediately following al-Nakba were stained by political assassinations and coups in Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan. Following the Palestine disaster, Egypt was thrown into political chaos. For a new religious party, the loss of Muslim land to create a Jewish state was nothing short of a betrayal of Islam. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood had been founded in March 1928 by Hasan al-Ba

In Syria, the Palestine disaster provoked a military coup d’йtat. President Shukri al-Quwwatli had long feared that his army would overthrow him, and on March 30, 1949, his fears were vindicated. Colonel Husni al-Za‘im, army chief of staff, led a bloodless coup described by veteran Syrian political Adil Arslan as “the most significant and strangest event in recent Syrian history.” In his diary, Arslan elaborated: “The general public celebrated, and the majority of the students took the opportunity to hold demonstrations in the streets. However, the political elites were struck silent with anxiety over the fate of their country.”36 Syria’s political elite were anxious to preserve the young Syrian republic’s democratic institutions. They feared military dictatorship, and with good reason. Though al-Za’im’s government lasted less than 150 days, his coup marked the entry of the military into Syrian politics. Except for a couple of brief hiatuses, military men would remained in control of Syria for the rest of the century. One of the strangest aspects of al-Za‘im’s rule, according to his foreign minister, Adil Arslan, was his willingness to come to terms with Israel so soon after Syria’s defeat. The armistice between Syria and Israel was concluded by Husni al-Za’im’s government on July 20, 1949. Behind the scenes, al-Za‘im was willing to go far beyond an armistice, to pursue a comprehensive peace treaty with Israel. With the full support of the U.S. government, al-Za’im relayed a series of proposals to Israeli prime minister David Ben-Gurion through the Syrian team at the armistice negotiations. Al-Za’im offered full normalization of relations between Syria and the Jewish state—an exchange of ambassadors, open borders, and full economic relations with Israel. Al-Za‘im’s proposal to settle up to 300,000 Palestinian refugees in Syria attracted the attention of both American and UN officials. It was already clear that the refugee problem would prove the greatest humanitarian issue and a major sticking point in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict. Al-Za’im sought U.S. development assistance for the Jazira District, north of the Euphrates River, where he proposed to settle the Palestinians. He believed that the injection of Palestinian labor and American funds would help modernize his country and develop its economy.37 The Israeli prime minister had no interest in al-Za‘im’s offer. Despite the best efforts of the Truman administration, UN mediator Dr. Ralph Bunche, and the Israeli foreign minister, Moshe Sharett, Ben-Gurion refused to meet with al-Za’im or even to discuss his proposals. Ben-Gurion insisted the Syrians sign an armistice first. He knew that al-Za?im wanted to adjust Syria?s boundaries to divide the Lake of Tiberias between Syria and Israel, which Ben-Gurion rejected out of hand. The Israeli prime minister was in no hurry to conclude peace deals with his Arab neighbors, and he certainly did not want to set a precedent of making territorial concessions to secure peace. If anything, Ben-Gurion worried that the boundaries of Israel, as reflected in the armistice agreements with its Arab neighbors, fell well short of the needs of the Jewish state. When Ben-Gurion refused to meet with al-Za‘im, the U.S. administration suggested a meeting between the foreign ministers of Syria and Israel. The U.S. ambassador to Damascus, James Keeley, approached al-Za’im’s foreign minister, Adil Arslan, to propose the meeting. Arslan was the scion of a princely Druze family who had entered government under al-Za‘im with some misgivings. In his diary he described the colonel as both a friend and a madman, though Keeley’s proposal, recorded by Arslan in his diary on June 6, 1949, convinced him that al-Za’im had lost his bearings. “Why do you want me to agree to hold a meeting with [Israeli foreign minister Moshe] Shertok,” Arslan asked the U.S. ambassador, “when you know that I have never been fooled by the bluffs of the Jews, and I am the last among the Arabs to make concessions to them?” “Your question forces me to give you a candid reply,” Keeley responded, “though I am not at liberty to discuss the matter, which remains secret. However, as I know you are an honourable man, I would ask for your word to keep the matter secret.” Arslan gave his word, and Keeley continued. “It was Za’im who suggested he meet with Ben-Gurion . . . who refused, so we [i.e., the U.S. administration] thought a meeting might be held between the foreign ministers of Syria and Israel. Shertok agreed, and put forward the suggestion which you have now rejected.” The astonished Arslan tried to hide his emotions as Keeley exposed al-Za’im’s secret diplomacy with the Israelis, and tried to dismiss the overture as a diplomatic ploy by the Syrian president. The American did not force the point and withdrew, leaving Arslan to contemplate his next move.38 Arslan stayed in his office late that night. He conferred with a member of the Syrian delegation to the armistice talks, who was convinced al-Za’im intended to meet with Shertok himself. Arslan considered stepping down but decided to stay in office to keep the Israelis from achieving their objective of getting Syria to break ranks with the other Arab states by concluding a separate peace deal. He began to contact other Arab governments to warn them of “a great danger,” though he was careful not to reveal what it was. Arslan’s reaction indicates how out of touch al-Za‘im had grown with both Syrian public opinion and the views of the political elite. Coming out of a bruising defeat, the Syrians were in no mood to make peace with Israel—the army least of all. Had al-Za?im gone public with his peace plan, he would have faced insurmountable opposition at home. Even so, too many respected international figures, including U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson, UN mediator Ralph Bunche, and a host of Israeli political and intelligence agents, were sufficiently persuaded of the merits of al-Za?im?s plan at the time for us to dismiss it out of hand today. What does emerge from the story is that it was in fact Ben-Gurion who ruled out the first Arab peace initiative. Faced with a peace plan that had both U.S. and UN backing, Ben-Gurion said no. Al-Za‘im did not head Syria long enough to give peace a chance. His reforms (of which peace overtures with Israel represented but a small part) alienated the different social groups that had originally supported his rise to power, leaving him isolated. Some of the officers who had supported his coup now plotted against him. On August 14, 1949, they repeated the measures taken in the March coup, arresting leading government figures and securing the radio station. A group of six armored cars surrounded al-Za’im’s house and, after a brief shootout, arrested the deposed president. Al-Za’im and his premier were taken to a detention center, where they were summarily executed.