Страница 104 из 142
During the course of the 1990s, US policy towards China was assailed by a growing range of different interest groups, from the labour unions which, concerned about the huge increase in Chinese imports, criticized China ’s trade practices, to human rights groups that protested about the treatment of dissidents and the subjugation of Tibet. [1167] While China policy remained a presidential rather than a congressional matter, it was relatively invulnerable to the critics’ complaints. However, it should not be assumed that the present American position towards China will inevitably be maintained into the indefinite future. Until the turn of the century, China impinged little on the conduct of American foreign policy, apart from in East Asia, and that was largely confined to the question of Taiwan. True, China’s exports to the United States — combined with the lack of competitiveness of the US’s own exports — had combined to produce a huge trade deficit between the two countries, but this was mitigated by China’s purchase of US Treasury bonds, which fuelled the American credit boom, and the benefit that American consumers enjoyed from the availability of ultra-cheap manufactured goods from China. But as China began to spread its wings at the begi
No sooner had the new century begun than two developments suggested that a major change in their relationship was likely, even though it did not appear immediately obvious that this was the case. First, the Bush administration abandoned the previously consensual multilateralist US foreign policy in favour of a unilateralist policy that, amongst other things, embraced the principle of pre-emptive strike. The US turned away from its previous espousal of universalism and towards a nationalism which denied or downplayed the need for alliances. The new strategy placed a priority on military strength and hard as opposed to soft power, a position made manifest in 2003 with the invasion of Iraq. The principle of national sovereignty was subordinated to the desirability of intervention for the purpose of regime-change. A new and aggressive America was born. [1169] In the event, an overwhelming majority of nation-states opposed the invasion of Iraq and, according to global opinion polls, an even more decisive majority of their citizens. As the occupation faced growing opposition and was perceived to have failed, the United States became unpopular to an extent not seen in the sixty years since the Second World War. [1170] Second, around 2003-5, the moment of China arrived, as global awareness of its transformation, and the meaning and effects of that transformation for the rest of the world, suddenly began to dawn. By accident, these two developments happened to coincide, thereby serving to accentuate their impact. [1171] It was widely acknowledged that China was on the rise and there was a slow dawning that the US was not as omnipotent as had previously been thought. There was a growing perception that the balance of power between the two countries was starting to shift in China ’s favour. [1172] The mood in the United States towards China grew more uncertain. [1173] James Ma
The general mood of uncertainty and unease was accentuated by the credit crunch which started in summer 2007 and which a year later brought the American financial sector to its knees, with illustrious names like Lehman Brothers going bankrupt and the few remaining American investment banks forced to renounce their status — Goldman Sachs, the favoured bank of recent US administrations, amongst them. In an extraordinary volte-face, the government a
GROWING CONFLICT
There are a number of issues that seem likely to shape US attitudes towards China and increase the possibility of conflict between the two countries.
The first concerns American attitudes towards globalization. In the 1990s globalization was seen in the US as a win-win situation, a process by which the US left its imprint on, and gained advantage in its relationship with, the rest of the world. In effect, it was something that the United States exported to the world and then reaped the benefits from at home. [1175] Now, however, globalization is seen more and more like a boomerang that is returning to haunt the US. [1176] Previously, the US was regarded as the overwhelming agent and beneficiary of globalization. Now the main beneficiary is perceived to be East Asia, and especially China. [1177] Through globalization, China has transformed itself into a formidable competitor of the United States, with its huge trade surplus, its massive ownership of US Treasury bonds, its consequent power over the value of the dollar, and the fact that it has undermined key sectors of American manufacturing industry, with growing numbers of workers being made redundant. The widening controversy over the value of the renminbi, the safety of Chinese exports such as food and toys, and the frequent accusations of ‘unfair’ competition, are a reflection of growing sensitivity towards China. [1178] This is not to suggest that the balance of American opinion has shifted significantly as yet. The wi
[1167] Ibid., pp. 96-7.
[1168] Robert Ross, ‘Engagement in US China Policy’, in Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross, eds, Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power (London: Routledge, 1999), p. 179.
[1169] Lampton, ‘ China ’s Rise in Asia Need Not Be at America ’s Expense’, p. 318; National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: September 2002); Martin Jacques, ‘The Neo-Con Revolution’, Guardian, 31 March 2005.
[1170] Image of US Falls Again’, International Herald Tribune, 14 June 2006; ‘Un ease About Big Powers “Rising”’, 27 June 2007, posted on www.bbc.co.uknews; ‘Distrust of US Gets Deeper But Not Wider’, International Herald Tribune, 28 June 2007.
[1171] Interview with Shi Yinhong, Beijing, 26 August 2005.
[1172] Robert Ross, ‘Engagement in US China Policy’, pp. 179-80.
[1173] Ke
[1174] Ma
[1175] Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree, pp. 372-3.
[1176] ‘ Red States and Blue Collars’, Financial Times, 3 August 2007. Hilary Clinton has expressed doubts about whether the Doha round should be revived; ‘Clin ton Doubts Benefits of Doha Revival’, Financial Times, 2 December 2007. There has been a major shift amongst mainstream economists, with growing scepticism about the virtues of globalization; Dani Rodrik, ‘The Death of the Globalization Consensus’, July 2008, posted on www.project-syndicate.org.
[1177] Clyde Prestowitz, ‘The Yuan Might Shift; the Imbalances Won’t’, International Herald Tribune, 1 June 2005; Prestowitz, Three Billion New Capitalists, p. 193.
[1178] Kynge, China Shakes the World, pp. 220-21.
[1179] Ma
[1180] David Pilling, ‘The President-Elect Must Ease Asian Anxieties’, Financial Times, 5 November 2008.
[1181] Pew Global Attitudes Project, World Publics Welcome Global Trade — But Not Immigration, 4 October 2007, posted on http://pewglobal.org, p. 14.