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Vietnam’s 2010 chairmanship saw Washington’s involvement in the South China Sea issue, including the Sino-American polemics at the ASEAN Regional Forum48. These moves were welcomed by Vietnam and a number of ASEAN states seeking the US’ support in opposing the PRC49.
Significant progress has been achieved in relations between ASEAN and its extra-regional partners. Specifically, the involvement of non-ASEAN countries in the regional affairs has radically changed – some of them actually started to set the tone for the evolution in Southeast Asia. China launched the Belt and Road Initiative, which aims to provide large-scale financial injections into ASEAN countries focusing on, but not limited to, the development of their infrastructure. Japan responded by the “Partnership for Quality Infrastructure” (hinting at the “poor-quality” Chinese), further politicizing economic cooperation. The US Republican Administration brought a second wind to the Quadrilateral Defense Cooperation (Quad) (USA, Japan, India, Australia) and introduced the “Indo-Pacific” narrative. Simultaneously, Washington created the “Blue Dot Network”, with the focus upon the infrastructure development. Lastly but importantly, extra-regional actors intensified their polities, from both substantial and institutional perspective, in the Mekong River basin.
As for the South China Sea, the assertiveness of Beijing in the maritime area did not weaken. The issue is perceived as one of the most important regional security challenges, while the international pressure on the PRC over it also increased radically.
In the economic sphere, a trend toward protectionism and a wider use of non-market regulatory methods has become widespread in the international politics. This could not but alert ASEAN, because the success of the export-oriented economies of its member states countries crucially depends on the free access to the external markets.
In general, the involvement of non-ASEAN countries in Southeast Asian affairs has increased while the launch of competing mega-projects has become a disturbing development for the Association. The initiatives of the great powers objectively began to “outweigh” ASEAN projects. The aftereffect is a decrease in the importance of ASEAN dialogue platforms, undermining ASEAN’s neutrality and central role in the Asia-Pacific multilateral cooperation. Lastly but importantly, understanding the complexity of intra-ASEAN processes, some non-regional players increasingly began to develop cooperation with individual ASEAN member states rather than with ASEAN as an international actor, which further intensified downward trends in the association.
At these complicated crossroads, ASEAN is forced to act very carefully. Though ASEAN was virtually unable to develop an effective approach that could consolidate the interests of great powers, it has not lost the role of a central negotiating platform in the region. In the context of the changes that have taken place over the past decade, this is an achievement in itself. And although the Association was unable to elaborate on instrumental links between its prospective plans and the Belt and Road Initiative, it was able to formulate its Indo-Pacific Vision50, which is also notable success.
In the economic sphere, due to the different level of economic development of its member countries, ASEAN could not ensure completely free movement of goods, services and capital in Southeast Asia. At the same time, the establishment of the ASEAN Economic Community has spurred the launch of specific projects to strengthen infrastructure interco
These factors suggest that the association has been relatively successful in coping with the decade-long challenges and associated risks which have been steadily rising. At this juncture, the role of chairmanship of a specific country, in terms of both its priorities and possibilities to translate them into reality, comes to the fore.
The Vietnam Perspective
Since 2010, Vietnam has been one of the most active ASEAN member countries in promoting the maintenance of ASEAN’s internal solidarity, regional resilience, common values, standards of conduct, as well as strengthening its central role in the Asia-Pacific multilateralism.
Beside the already discussed expansion of the EAS and the launch of ADMM Plus, Hanoi continued to engage non-regional partners in the dialogue in order to keep the Southeast Asian security challenges manageable. For example, Vietnam promoted ASEAN joint maritime drills with China in 2018 and with the United States in 2019. In the same strain, Hanoi is likely to make efforts to conduct similar drills with Russia in the year of its chairmanship51.
On the South China Sea issue, Vietnam’s policy aimed to achieve a consensus within ASEAN, as well as between ASEAN and its extra-regional partners. As a result, in May 2014, the foreign ministers of ASEAN issued a separate Statement on the South China Sea, for the first time since 199252.
The results of Vietnam’s involvement in the economic regionalism are dubious. In line with creating a network of free trade agreements with partners around the world, Hanoi, although it has markedly increased the volume of trade with nine partners in the Association, in percentage terms the ASEAN contribution to Vietnam’s foreign trade decreased from 18.1% to 11.3%, while the share of the East Asia Summit countries increased from 71.6% to 75% (See Table 1). But as practice demonstrates, for extra-regional states an FTA regime with Vietnam often becomes the first step for launching negotiations between non-regional partners with other ASEAN states and eventually for concluding an FTA with the Association.
Table 1. VIETNAM’S TRADE WITH EAS STATES IN 2009 AND 201953
Increased investment from both ASEAN and EAS members in Vietnam’s economy deserves mentioning. While in 2009 the USA ($9.8 billion), Cayman Islands ($2.2 billion) and Samoa ($1.7 billion) were leaders in terms of registered FDI, ten years later the list of major investors looked like this: the Republic of Korea ($7.9 billion), Hong Kong ($7.9 billion), Singapore ($4.5 billion), Japan ($4.1 billion), China ($ 4.1 billion)54.
In general, Vietnam’s contribution to ASEAN is more conspicuous in the political rather than in the economic sphere. Primarily, this is predetermined by objective constraints, mainly in the infrastructure development and the institutional spheres, the ASEAN co
Assessing Srv’s 2020 Priorities
This year, Vietnam intends to significantly increase ASEAN’s international stature. The attention is focused on ASEAN internal development issues with an emphasis on the strategic goal – the formation of the three-pillar integrated Community. As the leadership of the country has repeatedly emphasized, Hanoi will continue to build on the achievements of previous chairmanships and implement the tasks set in the “ASEAN Community Vision 2025” 55.
48
Hillary Clinton Changes America’s China Policy // Forbes, July 28, 2010. URL: https://www.forbes.com/2010/07/28/china-beijing-asia-hillary-clinton-opinions-columnists-gordon-g-chang.html#16e70ceb50c7 (date of access: 24.03.2020).
49
Vietnam, the US, and Japan in the South China Sea // The Diplomat, November 26, 2014. URL: https://thediplomat.com/2014/11/vietnam-the-us-and-japan-in-the-south-china-sea/ (date of access: 24.03.2020).
50
ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific // Association of Southeast Asian Nations, June 23, 2019. URL: https://asean.org/asean-outlook-indo-pacific/ (date of access: 24.03.2020).
51
Rossiya i ASEAN aktivno prorabatyvayut ideyu sovmestnyh uchenij VMS (Russia and ASEAN are actively working on the idea of joint naval exercises – in Russ.) // RIA Novosti, February 14, 2020. URL: https://ria.ru/20200214/1564687761.html (date of access: 21.03.2020).
52
ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Statement on the Current Developments in the South China Sea // Association of Southeast Asian Nations, May 10, 2014. URL: https://www.asean.org/storage/images/documents/24thASEANSummit/ASEAN%20Foreign%20Ministers%20Statement%20on%20the%20current%20developments%20in%20the%20south%20china%20sea.pdf (date of access: 21.03.2020).
53
The authors’ calculations based on the statistics provided by the General Department of Vietnam Customs, URL: https://www.customs.gov.vn/Lists/ThongKeHaiQuan/Default.aspx (date of access: 21.03.2020).
54
Tình hình thu hút đầu tư nước ngoài năm 2019 (Foreign Direct Investments in 2019 – in Viet.) // FIA Vietnam, January 7, 2020, URL: https://dautunuocngoai.gov.vn/ tinbai/6318/Tinh-hinh-thu-hut-dau-tu-nuoc-ngoai-nam-2019 (date of access: 21.03.2020).
55
Keynote speech by PM Nguyen Xuan Phuc at launching ceremony of VN’s 2020 ASEAN Chairmanship // Online Newspaper of the Government, January 6, 2020. URL: http://news.chinhphu.vn/Home/Keynote-speech-by-PM-Nguyen-Xuan-Phuc-at-launching-ceremony-of-VNs-2020-ASEAN-Chairmanship/20201/38445.vgp (date of access: 21.03.2020).