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Lastly, an increasingly worrying trend resulting from the on-going digital exchanges is a decrease of internal manageability in the Southeast Asian states. Among the noticeable developments, the so-called eco-chambers are noteworthy. The grass-root citizens subscribe to the media resources, including those that cover politicized issues on religion, ethno-separatism etc., which correspond to their preferences and ignore alternative sources of information42. Apart from spreading fake news, this allows politicians to manipulate the public opinion during the election campaigns, as well as to mobilize, should the need arise, large masses of people to anti-government protests. Even more significant aftereffect for ASEAN member states is the rise of terrorist activity in the digital sphere. In the Internet, terrorists may carry out their illegal activities without the risk of imprisonment while crypto-currency and blockchain technologies can be used for financing acts of terrorism. Moreover, in the Internet the dissemination of extremist literature is easy as this can be done quickly and in great numbers.
A relatively new but critically important development is the politicization of the dialogue between ASEAN and its partners, mainly China and the United States, in the digital sphere. As China’s and the US’ mega-strategies the Belt and Road Initiative and the Indo-Pacific region further evolve, their digital components come into conflict ASEAN’s interests.
China’s Digital Silk Road as part of the BRI is premised upon Beijing’s intention to set the standards of digital cooperation from both “hard” and “soft” infrastructure perspective. As China strengthens its positions in the international industrial cooperation, it expands the reach of its ICT solutions. A representative example is the railway that will co
The security implications of the Digital Silk Road for ASEAN are also likely to be far-reaching. As Southeast Asia integrates in China’s digital space, the aftereffects will range from the PRC’s possibilities to manipulate information during the elections (for instance, at the electronic voting and the vote-count procedures) to gathering security-related information. If this scenario even partially materializes, the degree of ASEAN’s vulnerability vis-à-vis China may well increase exponentially.
The US-ASEAN cooperation also includes the digital component. Of note is the US-ASEAN Cyber Dialogue. In the view of the US, ASEAN is a fast-growing market for digital services. The US-ASEAN Business Council estimates that there are 914 million active mobile co
Asean’s Pains and Remedies
Considering all the developments outlined above, a timely question is what specific dangers ASEAN is exposed to, as well as what countermeasures it can adopt. Some observations are worthy of note.
Arguably, the association faces real prospects for losing its digital sovereignty (understood as ASEAN’s own digital infrastructure and strong digital competences, as well as the ASEAN member states’ ability to implement an independent policy in the internet in accordance with the international law), mostly as an aftereffect of the emerging Sino-US contradictions. In fact, the association is again being torn apart by China and the United States, this time along the digital lines, with prospects for digital bipolarity. While China and the US have repeatedly declared their intention to draw a line between their political contradictions and strengthen economic interdependence, including in Southeast Asia, does this priority extend to the digital sphere, and is the Sino-US technological interdependence possible? Or can it – by its definition – be nothing a “weaponized interdependence” at best?
Another potential threat for the association stems from prospects for new imbalances, both between and within (emphasis added – the authors) the Southeast Asian states. The Fourth Industrial Revolution entails large-scale social aftereffects, mainly a widening income gap, which will overlap with the deep-rooted social, ethnic and religious problems prevalent in Southeast Asia. If so, ASEAN will be unable to successfully develop regional integration as long as the processes of national integration are unfinished.
ASEAN’s vulnerability is reinforced by potentially negative implications for ASEAN-led multilateral dialogue platforms on political-security issues. As China continues to build its own security system in Eurasia portraying itself as the exclusive provider of economic benefits, the ASEAN-driven multilateral venues are likely to slip into irrelevance.
For ASEAN, a core premise in tackling these problems comes from its readiness to perform a double-edged task. The association should increase the manageability of challenges it encountered before the present digital problems appeared and at the same time strengthen its digital capacity-building. Both tasks make ASEAN upgrade its relations with extra-regional partners.
But these partners should simultaneously (emphasis added – the authors) meet multiple criteria. As the confrontation between the Asia-Pacific big powers is rising, this partner should be willing to preserve the ASEAN-favored neutrality and inclusivity in “driving” the regional multilateral dialogue. As digitalization is a global phenomenon, this partner should be an established global power capable of shaping the global digital agenda. As ASEAN needs digital competences, this partner should respond to these expectations. As the association is scared by the intentions of China and the US to obtain unilateral benefits at the expense of ASEAN, this partner should be free from such intentions.
Reiterating that these criteria should be met fully rather than partially, among ASEAN’s array of external partners there is only one appropriate. This is the Russian Federation, which recently enhanced its relations with ASEAN to the level of Strategic Partnership. To make this relationship really strategic, as its name suggests, ASEAN and Russia should develop future-oriented, long-term and resourceful directions of cooperation. Arguably, the digital sphere offers the parties the best presently available option.
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Tapsell R. 2018 Echo Chambers and a Sectarian Public Sphere in Southeast Asia. ASEAN Focus. URL: https://www.iseas.edu.sg/images/pdf/ASEANFocus%20Oct%202018.pdf (date of access: 27.12.2019).
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Four companies to provide ICT services for China-Laos railway // China Daily. URL: https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2017-01/11/content_27922745.htm (date of access: 28.12.2019).
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ASEAN’s Digital Economy is Projected to Exceed $240 Billion by 2025 // US-ASEAN Business Council. URL: https://www.usasean.org/why-asean/digital-economy (date of access: 28.12.2019).
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Parameswaran P. What’s Behind the New US-ASEAN Cyber Dialogue? // The Diplomat.URL:https://thediplomat.com/2019/10/whats-behind-the-new-us-asean-cyber-dialogue/ (date of access: 29.12.2019).
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Advancing digital co