The Confusion

"Madame la duchesse d'Arcachon has told me that monads are akin to little souls."

Leibniz paused. "Soul is a word frequently mentioned in co

"Are they like human souls?"

"Not at all. Allow me, your highness, to attempt to explain how this troublesome word soul became entangled in this discourse. When a philosopher braves the labyrinth, and sets about dividing and subdividing the universe into smaller and smaller units, he knows that at some point he must stop, and say, ‘Henceforth I'll subdivide no further, for I have at last arrived at the smallest, elemental, indivisible unit: the fundamental building-block of all Creation.' And then he can no longer dodge and evade, but must finally stick his neck out, as it were, and make an assertion as to what that building-block is like: what its qualities are, and how it interacts with all the others. Now, nothing is more obvious to me than that the interactions among these building-blocks are stupefyingly numerous, complicated, fluid, and subtle; just look about yourself for irrefutable proof, and try to think what can explain spiders, moons, and eyeballs. In such a vast web of dependencies, what laws are to govern the ma

"What do you mean, ‘perceive'? Do monads have eyes?"

"It must be quite a bit simpler. It is a logical necessity. A monad in my fingernail feels the gravity of Titan, does it not?"

"I believe that is what the law of Universal Gravitation dictates."

"I deem that to be perception. Monads perceive. But monads act as well. If we could transport ourselves much closer to Saturn, and get into the sphere of influence of its moon Titan, my fingernail, along with the rest of me, would fall into it—which is a sort of collective action that my monads take in response to their perception of Titan. So, your highness: What do we know of monads thus far?"

"Infinitely small."

"One mark."

"All the universe explainable in terms of their interactions."

"Two marks."

"They perceive all the other monads in the universe."

"Three. And—?"

"And they act."

"They act, based on what?"

"Based on what they perceive, Dr. Leibniz."

"Four marks! A perfect score. Now, what must be true about monads, to make all of these things possible?"

"Somehow all of these perceptions are flooding into the monad, and then it sort of decides what action to take."

"That follows unavoidably from all that has gone before, doesn't it? And so, summing up, it would appear that monads perceive, think, and act. And this is where the idea comes from, that a monad is a little soul. For perception, cogitation, and action are soul-like, as opposed to billiard-ball-like, attributes. Does this mean that monads have souls in the same way that you and I do? I doubt it."

"Then what sorts of souls do they have, Doctor?"

"Well, let us answer that by taking an inventory of what we know they do. They perceive all the other monads, then think, so that they may act. The thinking is an internal process of each monad—it is not supplied from an outside brain. So the monad must have its own brain. By this I do not mean a great spongy mass of tissue, like your highness's brain, but rather some faculty that can alter its internal state depending on the state of the rest of the universe—which the monad has somehow perceived, and stored internally."

"But would not the state of the universe fill an infinite number of books!? How can each monad store so much knowledge?"

"It does because it has to," said the Doctor. "Don't think of books. Think of a mirrored ball, which holds a complete image of the universe, yet is very simple. The ‘brain' of the monad, then, is a mechanism whereby some rule of action is carried out, based upon the stored state of the rest of the universe. Very crudely, you might think of it as like one of those books that gamblers are forever poring over: let us say, ‘Monsieur Belfort's Infallible System for Wi

"Is Dr. Waterhouse going to study monads in Massachusetts, then?" Caroline asked.

"Allow me to frame an analogy, once more, to Alchemy," Daniel said. "Newton wishes to know more of atoms, for it is through atoms that he'd explain Gravity, Free Will, and everything else. If you visited his laboratory, and watched him at his labours, would you see atoms?"

"I think not! They are too small," Caroline laughed.

"Just so. You instead would see him melting things in crucibles or dissolving them in acids. What do such activities have to do with atoms? The answer is that Newton, unable to see atoms with even the finest microscope, has said, ‘If my notion of atoms is correct, then such-and-such ought to happen when I drop a pinch of this into a beaker of that.' He gives it a go and sees neither success nor failure but some other thing he did not anticipate; then he goes off and broods over it, and re-jiggers his notions of atoms, and devises a new experimentum crucis, and re-iterates. Likewise, if your highness were to visit Massachusetts and see me at work in my Institute, you'd not see any monads lying about on counter-tops. Rather you would see me toiling over machines that are to thinking what beakers, retorts, et cetera, are to atoms: Machines that, like monads, apply simple rules to information that is supplied to them from without."

"How will you know that these machines are working as they ought to? A clock may be compared to the wheeling of the heavens to judge whether it is working aright. But what is the action that your machine will take, after it has applied the rule, and made up its mind? And how will you know whether it is correct?"

"That is easier than you might suppose. For as Dr. Leibniz has pointed out, the rules need not be complicated. The Doctor has written out a system for conducting logical operations through manipulation of symbols, according to certain rules; think of it as being to propositions what algebra is to numbers."